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Abstract 
Despite the centrality of registers to the arbitration system in New Zealand, very little work has been done on 
the role of registers in state-society relationships, and in the strncturation of actors and interests in specific 
industries. This paper uses registers in examining the industrial relations processes and outcomes in two 
major industries - meat processing and the wateifront which historically have been central to NZ as a small 
state in a world market. Our paper focuses on what we call the 'neglected dimension' of registration - regis-
tration systems that operated outside the industrial relations (i.e. arbitration) system per se, but had consider· 
able industrial relations consequences. Our argument is that in the meat and wateifront industries these 
registers were as important, if not more important, for industrial relations than the conventional arbitration 
system registers, surviving both changes in technology and the law. The focus will thus be on the 'unintended 
consequences' of the specific form of registration scheme that was institutionalised by the State in each indus· 
try. Further, in each case, the unintended consequences were central to attempts by state actors to reform the 
industries. Pressures to reform industrial relations practices in these industries were intertwined with the 
abolition .of the industry-specific registration schemes. As a result, reform of industrial relations hinged on 
developments other than the Employment Contracts Act 1991. 
Keywords: industrial relations, registers, registration systems, meat industry, waterfront industry, firms, un-
ions, unintended consequences 
From its origins in the Industrial Conciliation and Arbitra-
tion Act (1894), the New Zealand State established a sys-
tem of industrial relations that has been approximated only 
by Australia. Through this system, State-appointed agen-
cies mediated power relations between employers and un-
ions. In no sense did 'labour' and 'capital' confront each 
other unmediated, as already organised 'blocs ' . Rather le-
gal regulation constituted actors and interests. Walsh and 
Fougere (1987) argue that the law did not merely regulate 
and constrain already existing sets of actors and interests 
in the arena of industrial relations, it was crucial in consti-
ruting sets of actors and interests. 1 The primary way in which 
actors and interests were constituted was through registra-
tion systems, which resulted in the constitution of unions 
and employer associations as legal entities. 
Despite the centrality of registers (and registration systems) 
to the arbitration system, very little work has been done on 
the role of registers in state-society relationships, and in 
the structuration (Giddens 1984) of actors and interests in 
specific industries. Or, pushing it further, to understand 
registers as an institutional form of governance, one way 
in which the state secured relationships between sets of 
corporate actors (in the heyday of the regulated period). 
lllis paper is a first attempt at that task. It uses registers 
themselves as the 'unit of analysis', in examining indus-
trial relations processes and outcomes in two major indus-
tries - meat freezing and the waterfront. These industries 
have been central to NZ as a 'small state in a world mar-
ket' (Katzenstein, 1985). Because of their centrality these 
industries have been major targets for reform. 
Our paper focuses on what we call the 'neglected dimen-
sion' of registration. By this we mean, registration sys-
tems that operated outside the industrial relations (arbitra-
tion) system per se, but which had considerable industrial 
relations consequences. These 'external' registration sys-
tems secured relationships between sets of actors within 
the industrial relations arena. Our argument is that in both 
the meat and waterfront industries these registers were as 
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important, if not more important, for industrial relations 
than the conventional arbitration system registers, surviv-
ing changes both in technology and the law. 
Moreover, some of these industrial relations outcomes (and 
the types of relationships they secured) were neither in-
tended nor anticipated by state actors. The focus will thus 
be on the 'unintended consequences' (Walsh and Fourgere, 
1987) of the specific form of registration scheme that was 
institutionalised by the State in each industry. In each case, 
the unintended consequences led to attempts by state ac-
tors to reform the industries. 
To the extent that registers existed outside the industrial 
relations system, pressure to reform industrial relations 
practices in these industries took place as much outside of 
industrial relations regulatory frameworks as within them. 
In each case, this involved the abolition of the industry-
specific registration schemes. Simply stated, refoan of in-
dustrial relations hinged on developments other than the 
Employment Contracts Act (ECA) 1991. 
While the focus will be on industrial relations , convention-
ally defined, the use of registers as the 'unit of analysis' 
has broader implications. Historically, the two industries 
in question have been the site of historic tensions between 
capital and labour - between fanners and watersiders, be-
tween farmers and meatworkers (Turkington, 1976). The 
analysis of registers casts new light on the sources of this 
tension, and thus provides a new window through which to 
explore New Zealand state-society relationships in the post-
war period. 
Registers in the meat and waterfront 
industries 
In the meat industry, firms were registered. On the water-
front, workers were registered. Our contention is that these 
different forms of registration had similar effects. In both 
industries, what resulted was a particular configuration of 
actors and interests in the industrial relations arena that re-
sulted from variously capital (in the meat industry) and la-
bour (in the waterfront industry) being 'organised' through 
registration schemes that operated external to the indus· 
trial relations system. These configurations of industrial 
relations were largely unintended. 
The central form of registration that operated in the meat 
industry was the licensing of meat firms by the Meat Pro-
ducers ' Board. This registration system was intended to 
reconfigure the relationship in product-markets between 
meat fmns and their farmer-suppliers. The registration of 
all firms was intended and operated to advance the collec-
tive interests of farmers, by fostering competition for stock 
in part by securing small firms. At the same time, in an 
indirect and unintended manner it secured organised la-
bour in meat processing plants (freezing works). The re-
working of registration (through the ending of licensing) 
and partial rationalisation of fians in the meat industry from 
the early 1980's has systematically eroded union strength. 
On the waterfront, the occupational registration scheme, 
which had the immediate effect of decasualising the labour 
market, had the broader effect of positioning the collective 
labour market actors in particular ways. Moreover, this 
scheme had the unintended consequence of strengthening 
the unions and supporting the existence of small firms. 
These developments intersected in the 1970's, when sev-
eral of the port unions became involved in establishing small 
new entrant stevedoring firms. In many regards, the most 
recent phase of the post-reform period can be understood 
as a reworking of the relationships between the union and 
small firms , since the abolition of the registration scheme 
in 1989. 
The meat industry: The registration of firms 
Registration in the meat industry was secured through the 
Meat Producers' Board and was undenaken in the collec-
tive interests of fanners. This intervention was intended to 
favourably position fanners in product markets. 
The Meat Producers' Board was established by Act of Par-
liament in 1923. The Board was constituted as an autono-
mous body, elected by farmers, and empowered to take 
control of all aspects of the meat industry. As a statutory 
agent the Board immediately proceeded to act in what it 
perceived to be the collective interests of fanners. The con-
text for this was an unprecedented slump in prices paid for 
New Zealand meat in the United Kingdom and the mount-
ing incursions of transnational meat firms into the indus-
try. Fanners and the Board clearly believed that there was 
a link between the decline in prices enjoyed by fanners in 
markets for stock and meat and the growing influence of 
large, integrated, firms like Borthwicks, Vesteys, Swifts and 
Armour. Consequently, the Board intervened across the 
industry in an effon to curb the transnationals and to for-
tify those channels still external to the vertically-integrated 
firms. 
The Board imposed an independent system of inspection 
in processing plants and storage facilities, and assumed 
control over the grading of meat exports. It also assumed 
responsibility for all aspects of shipping, including the ne-
gotiation of freight rates and the scheduling of shipments. 
The Board 's strictures on inspection, grading and shipping 
were imposed on all cargoes leaving New Zealand, includ-
ing those owned by fanners or their agents and by local 
and transnational meat firms. These initiatives have been 
described as a grand averaging scheme by which econo-
mies of scale and scope were prevented from transforming 
the industry and the character of fanning (Cunis, 1993, 
1996, 1998, forthcoming; Moran, Blunden and Bradly, 
1996). 
The single most important component of the Board's inter-
ventions-in defence of farmers-was the licensing of process-
ing plants and meat firms. This licensing acted as an exclu· 
sive registration of firms in the industry. It restricted their 
capacity lo enter and leave the industry and provided guide-
lines on the level of throughput they could attain. In so 
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doing. the Board was avowedly opposed to any further ac-
quisition and operation of freezing works by transnational 
finns. 2 
The Board used registration through licensing to constrain 
the transnationals and to forestall closures of outlying and 
marginal processing plants owned by local interests. For 
example, the Board made it known to the North American 
firm, Armour, that should it succeed in acquiring a freez-
ing works in New Zealand, any output from this freezing 
works would be denied a meat-export license. The Board 
effectively ended the attempt by Armour to buy freezing 
works in New Zealand. By the same mechanism in 1929 
the Board placed restrictions on the output of the freezing 
works already owned by Vesteys and Borthwicks. These 
restrictions were not lifted until 1952. 
Further, the licensing of firms reversed the more common 
'franchising' arrangements pursued elsewhere in industry 
by states and licensing authorities. The granting of a li-
cense by the Board to any firm did not guarantee that busi-
ness a throughput, nor did the license secure an exclusive 
catchment or territory for the firm in which to buy stock. 
Rather, the granting of a license by the Board permined the 
firm only to make offers to local farmers for stock in com-
petition with other registered firms and businesses involved 
in the domestic industry. In this sense registration operated 
to capture and consttain the operations of capital. 
An important motivation for registtation was to enforce 
competition for stock by firms in each farming district 
around the country. Registtation secured a multiplicity of 
firms in processing and export and, by protecting small 
firms, engendered competition. The intensity of competi-
tion for stock and the excess capacities owned by firms 
meant that issues of throughput were paramount to them. 
In other words, registration consolidated a mix of owner-
ship and operation in the industry wherein all firms -large 
and small- were vulnerable to farmers acting as suppliers. 
This vulnerability affirms to farmer~suppliers was under-
scored by the seasonal nature of the industry. Ultimately 
the length and timing of the operation of individual freez-
ing works was shaped by external and highly seasonal die~ 
tates of pasture growth and husbandry. Consequently firms 
were forced to emphasise throughput and break even in the 
seasonal operation of their freezing works. Each killing 
season the amount of stock available for slaughter was 
more-or-less fixed and individual plants and multi-plant 
firms struggled to fill their books. Clearly this construction 
of the product market was to the considerable advantage of 
farmers. 
Similarly, the registration of firms and the practices it en-
gendered was advantageous to meatworkers and their un-
ion. In short, firms in the industry had many of the features 
of weak employers (Fox and Flanders, 1969). Firms were 
equally vulnerable to the actions from the unions which 
might disrupt their efforts to secure adequate levels of 
throughput (product) each killing season. Although the spe~ 
cific relationship remains unclear, the additional pressures 
of seasonality in processing undoubtedly shaped lhe pre-
disposition of meatworkers to go on strike. While the re-
sulting patterns of industrial disharmony were for some time 
a topic of considerable interest to scholars and industrial 
relations practitioners, of greater signi ficance to the col-
lective labour market actors were rules of seniority. 
Seniority was central to the form of control garnered by 
the meatworkers unions over the registered firms. As a un-
ion practice it utilised the formalisation of a queuing ar-
rangement for jobs. These rules guaranteed employment 
for workers across killing seasons. Without any rules of 
seniority meatworkers faced the prospect of minimal secu-
rity in their employment from killing season to killing sea-
son, while their elected representatives could have been 
singled out and effectively blacklisted. Seniority secured a 
form of unionising within plants as well as regulating the 
labour market. Hence, the union's fostering of rules of sen-
iority for employment in freezing works meant codifying 
and stabilising not so much the right to work as the rules 
governing who had access to work and their tenure in a 
killing season. 
The meatworkers' unions won control over seniority, and 
closure of the labour market, on a plant by plant basis. This 
culminated in the National Award of 1958 which formal-
ised of rules of seniority throughout the industry and rati -
fied the union's informal control of the labour market and, 
in particular, of the practices of hiring and firing. This domi-
nance by the union was to last into the 1980's. It was un-
done in large part because of the end to licensing by the 
Meat Producers' Board in 1981. 
During the 1970's and 1980's the meat industry encou~­
tered increasing problems stemming largely from the satu-
ration and closure of product markets in the European Com-
munity. An important aspect of this was the retrenchment 
and I or collapse of the vertically-integrated, transnational, 
firms. Swifts exited the industry in 1973, Borthwicks in 
1981, and Vesteys in 1994. Interestingly the first redun-
dancies in the industry occurred in 1973 with the closure 
of plants owned by Swifts. Conversely there was mount-
ing pressure from ' new entrant' fmns to establish and ex-
pand processing capacity (Hartle}', 1989). Further, there was 
the more general problem of excess processing capacity in 
the industry. 
The end of industrial licensing in 1981 allowed new and 
existing firms to establish greenfield sites in which the 'tra-
ditional' role of the union was less clear. At the same time, 
technical innovations in processing provided an additional 
impetus for reductions in the numbers of workers in plants. 
These pressures combined to force the meatworkers union 
onto the back foot. By the end of the 1980's the union had 
been decisively defeated and was no longer able to operate 
effectively on a national or regional level. The National 
Award, which had been the mechanism by which the union 
had levered up pay and conditions in outlying plants, had 
more or less become a fiction. 
The ECA added to the disintegration of the meatworkers' 
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union(s). In a number of cases, new entrant firms were able 
to impose individual contracts on the workforce and to ex-
clude the union. More commonly, the focus of union activ-
ity has become the survival of individual plants. In the con-
text of intensified competitive pressure and what is com-
monly regarded as a contracting industry this introduces a 
dynamic for union activities to ratchet down pay and con-
ditions (labour costs) in an imagined trade-off for job secu-
rity. 
The fragmentation of the union has coincided with a re-
casting of seasonal employment. In a number of cases meat 
firms have successfully challenged the notion of a distinct 
killing season. Rather they have opened and closed plants 
on a weekly or monthly basis as stock is available. Cer-
tainly the traditional arrangements by which plants re-
mained open and the workforce employed regardless of 
whether stock were available for processing have ended. 
This recasting of seasonality directly impacts the rights of 
seniority enforced by the union. While the traditional ar-
rangements of ' last-on first-off' still prevail in the industry 
the disruption of seasonal employment introduces the like-
lihood of casualisation. 
The waterfront industry: The registration 
of labour 
Although registers are mentioned in most international stud-
ies of the waterfront (e.g. Jensen 1964; Turnbull and 
Sapsford 1997), the discussion is largely restricted to their 
role in decasualising the waterfront labour market. How-
ever, the specific form of occupational registration scheme 
that was institutionalised by the State in New Zealand had 
an effect broader than that of merely decasualising the la-
bour market. Registration positioned the collective labour 
market actors in particular ways, and had the unintended 
consequence of strengthening the unions and supporting 
the existence of small firms. Whilst the occupational regis-
tration scheme was located outside the province of indus-
trial relations, strictly defined, like the firm registration 
scheme in the meat industry, its effects nonetheless impacted 
substantially on industrial relations. 
The occupational registration scheme that was institution-
alised by the State in modified form in 1953 (after the 195 1 
waterfront dispute) established an exclusive register of wa-
terfront workers at every pon in the country. The scheme 
was administered by the Waterfront Industry Commission, 
which operated labour engagement bureaux at each port. 
From these bureaux, registered watersiders were allocated 
to employers on a job-to-job basis. 
The occupational registration scheme abrogated the traditional 
rights of firms as employers- principally their right 'to hire and 
ftre ' (Edwards, 1979: 16)- in a way that meant that individual 
finns were not significant actors in the labour market Compet-
ing firms were forced to cooperate through the local Pon Em-
ployers Association and to yield decisions over the supply of 
labour to this organisation. The waterfront labour market thus 
was organised around the legally defined 'occupation' ofwa-
terside work, rather than around firms, taking a "labour-market 
wide 'occupational' form" (Stinchcombe 1990: 262). 
While the occupational registration scheme resulted in sig-
nificant costs to firms (Reveley 1997), there were also sub-
stantial benefits. Firms involved in stevedoring were guar-
anteed a supply of labour for the length of each job, which 
relieved them of the need to employ their own workforce 
directly. The main advantage of this scheme, from the em-
ployers point of view, was having a co1lectively funded, 
guaranteed supply of skilled labour on hand to meet their 
fluctuating daily labour requirements. TQis provided space 
for small firms operating on short-term or insecure con-
tracts, in a fluctuating service product market, where the 
cost of permanently employing labour would otherwise 
have been prohibitive (Reveley 1996). 
Far from firm size being an independent variable in rela-
tion to the labour market, as it is often regarded (e.g. 
Fligstein and Fernandez, 1988), there was a strong sense in 
which- at least in the case of small firms· firms size was a 
dependent variable in relation to the labour market. It was 
dependent on the occupational registration system that the 
labour market was organised around. Finn size was as much 
a function of the type of labour market as the type of la-
bour market was a function of firm size. 
The second unintended consequence of the bureau system 
of occupational registration, is that it strengthened the un-
ions (the National Waterside Workers Union having been 
smashed in 1951, and replaced by 26 new port unions). 
This system both protected and empowered the new un-
ions, and provided security of employment to their mem-
bers. Union membership was compulsory (and remained 
so after compulsory unionism was abolished in other in-
dustries) in that all registered watersiders were required to 
belong to the local pan union. Moreover, 'preference' in 
performing waterfront work was granted to this occupa-
tional group.3 Formal joint control of register numbers gave 
the unions the ability to restrict the size of the workforce, 
and the size of their own membership. Waterfront union-
ism thrived in this institutional environment, and by the 
late 1950's the pon unions had regained much of what had 
been lost, in terms of wages and conditions, in the after-
math of the 1951 dispute (Reveley 1996: 162-3). 
Moreover, the unions' control of the labour supply contin-
ued to strengthen (despite the existence of formal 'joint 
control'). Part of the unions' response to technological 
change in the form of containeri sation - which exerted 
downward pressure on register numbers - was to restrict 
and then eliminate supplementary (i.e. non-registered) 
casual labour. The limitation on casuals was established 
through the Waterfront Industry Conference, a conciliation 
forum specially constituted in response to containerisation. 
In line with the agreement to restrict casuals, subsidiary 
registers of 'approved' casual workers were created at pons 
throughout the country in 1970-71. From that time on, there 
existed two registers at each port: the bureau register, and 
the union-sponsored subsidiary register of supplementary 
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casuals. Like the bureau register these subsidiary registers 
were 'exclusive' in nature, and were adeptly used by the 
unions as 'organising tools' to effect labour market clo-
sure. Through the use of these registers, the unions accom-
plished the transformation of a series of legislatively de-
fined local labour markets, organised around statutorily 
enacted bureau registers at the port level, into a sealed na-
tional labour market (Reveley 1999, forthcoming). 
To recap, the two main unintended consequences of the 
occupational registration scheme were that it strengthened 
the unions (leading to a union-controlled labour market) 
and supported the existence of small firms. These effects 
of the registration system intersected in the 1970's, when 
several of the port unions became involved in establishing 
small new entrant stevedoring firms, in the form of joint 
ventures. Thus the 'space' that the bureau system provided 
for small firms supplied a significant opportunity for the 
unions- to set themselves up in business. Certainly, small 
firms posed no threat to the unions, and in a number of 
cases, through the joint ventures, the unions materially ben-
efited from the existence of small finns. 
During the 1970's and 1980's a whole host of pressures for 
reform built up (Reveley 1997). Foremost among these the 
level of union control over the labour market, which re-
sulted in the industry becoming stuck in a 'halfway house ' , 
without the labour efficiency afforded by permanent em-
ployment or the labour flexibility afforded by the ability to 
use supplementary casual labour. This was compounded 
both by the level of control that watersiders exerted over 
work practices, and the fact that voluntary redundancies 
did not keep pace with the decline in work associated with 
containerisation. 
This concatenation of pressures ultimately led to abolition 
of the registration system in 1989. One of the principal ef-
fects of this reform, is that it abolished an institutional 
framework that, paradoxically, supported both unionisation 
and the existence of small firms. It also disrupted networks 
that closely linked unions and small firms themselves. In 
many regards, the most recent phase of the reform process 
can be understood as stemming from a reworking of the 
relationships between the union and small firms, in the con-
text of the ECA 1991. 
The abolition of the Waterfront Industry Commission in 
1989 resulted in a shift to direct employment by firms in-
volved in stevedoring. For the first time in almost 50 years, 
firms became the organisational form that employed and 
managed waterfront labour. Small firms which invariably 
could not afford to hire permanent labour, including most 
of the aforementioned joint ventures, almost completely 
disappeared from the waterfront. The dramatic alterations 
in employment arrangements also broke down the national 
labour market, and resulted in major changes to the terms 
and conditions of work and work practices. To be sure, sig-
nificant elements of the labour supply aspects of the previ-
ous union-controlled labour market continued for a time, 
in that the union continued to enforce restrictions on the 
labour supplied to employers (Reveley 1997). The union 
succeeded in restricting casual employment through a 
'casual ratio', and also kept not only permanent watersiders 
but also the bulk of casuals unionised, effectively restrict-
ing employers to using union labour and limiting down-: 
ward pressure on labour rates. 
However, in the absence of the registration scheme, and in 
the presence of the ECA 1991, there has been a shift from a 
union-controlled labour market, to one in which employ-
ers increasingly define the contours and character of the 
labour market. As in the meat industry, the main effect of 
the ECA has been to reinforce the demise of the union, 
which ultimately stemmed from the abolition of the regis-
tration system. 
Intensified competitive pressure, together with increased 
potential under the ECA to compete on the basis of labour 
costs, has meant that employers are increasingly challeng-
ing the union's remaining control over the labour supply 
by using casuals in preference to permanently employed 
watersiders. In the last four years, the number of casual 
workers has increased dramatically on the conventional 
wharves at ports throughout New Zealand,4 and the level 
of unionisation of casuals has declined (Reveley 1999). 
Until recently, no company had successfully circumvented 
the union and set up a totally non-unionised workforce. 
However, this situation changed with the emergence of two 
small new entrant stevedoring companies at the Port of 
Tauranga (the country's largest export port) that employ 
non-union workforces comprised solely of casual and part-
time employees.5 0pportunistic small firms, operating now 
as stand-alone labour market actors, mark the greatest threat 
that the union is currently facing. It is the uncoupling of 
the links between unions, unionisation and small firms -
formerly secured by a registration scheme- that represents 
the most recent phase of waterfront reform. 
Conclusion 
Registration of firms in the meat industry and labour in the 
waterfront industry constituted actors and sets of relation-
ships in the arena of industrial relations. Like the registra-
tion schemes associated with the arbitration system, the 
legally enacted registration schemes were not merely con-
straining - in the sense of regulating existing sets of inter-
ests - they created sets of actors and interests and shaped 
the relationships between them. These forms of registra-
tion lay outside what is typically regarded as the ambit of 
industrial relations and in both cases generated very sig-
nificant unintended consequences. The most significant of 
these was the empowerment of the union. In both cases, 
the elimination of industry-specific forms of registration 
heralded restructuring of the industry and its industrial re-
lations. In this respect, the ECA merely added to industry-
specific dynamics for change. 
We argue that much of the specificity of change is missed 
insofar as the ECA is conceptualised as exclusively para-
digmatic of the industrial relations arena. In this respect, a 
focus on registers and other 'resources' (Walsh and Fougere, 
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1987) as constituting collective labour market actors and 
their relationships emerges as being very important If noth-
ing else, this sort of appreciation shifts attention from nar-
row and at times legalistic interpretations of induStrial re-
lations to the richer considerations of governance and its 
institutional forms. Similarly, such a shift encourages re-
search that transcends abstracted arguments about unions, 
firms and the character of labour markets (Fligstein and 
Fernandez, 1988; Gospel, 1992). 
Future research 
The authors are interested in researching the changing na-
ture of work, management and industrial relations in Aus-
tralasia. They are continuing research into the transforma-
tions of the meat and waterfront industries. Further atten-
tion needs to be given to the re-configuration of industrial 
relations actors and identities in the two industries after the 
demise of registration. In particular, there is a pressing need 
to examine union strategies and the prospects for organ-
ised labour. 
Notes 
The arbitration system was as much about the making 
of groups and the structuring of relationships among 
them as it was about the setting of wages or conditions' 
(Walsh and Fougere, 1987: 192). 
''This Board will look with an unfriendly eye upon: (a) 
The purchase by overseas interests of any freezing works 
in New Zealand. (b) The acquiring of any interest in 
New Zealand freezing works by overseas interests. (c) 
The erection of new freezing works in New Zealand by 
overseas interests" (Hayward, 1972: 162). 
However, non-registered casual watersiders could be 
employed, as a supplementary source of labour, when 
registered watersiders were not available. 
To date, casual employees are only used to a limited 
degree within the country's four container terminals. 
The companies are International Stevedoring Operations 
(ISO) and Independent Stevedoring Limited (IS). 
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